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Abstract  
Utilizing evidence from a United Kingdom (UK) road case study Private Finance Initiative 
(PFI) project, this paper considers how the UK central government’s infrastructure strategy is 
operationalized through accounting-based performance measures and incentive systems, and 
articulates how the adoption of such systems is moderated by trust practices. The findings 
indicate that initial government policy objectives, translated as performance indicators in the 
case study, failed to offer adequate incentives for contractors and created tensions. However, 
controls were later developed through inter-party trust practices for managing performance 
and relational risk. These findings have important implications for PFI policy and practice, 
including that negotiation can: (i) lead to pragmatic controls being introduced to foster 
cooperation and trust-building; and (ii) provide opportunities for adapting the monitoring and 
incentive mechanisms. This study also contributes to previous literature where PFI control 
systems were largely regarded as inadequate for dealing with unforeseen conflicts between 
parties. 
 
Keywords: Private Finance Initiative (PFI), Public Private Partnerships (PPPs), Accounting, 
Management controls, Performance measurement, Trust.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
The recent financial crisis encouraged governments globally to introduce policies designed to 
reduce public spending (Heald and Steel 2017). Initiatives ranging from outright sale 
(privatization) to mixed/hybrid models of public service delivery can be traced back to the 
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1980s (Warner and Bel 2008; Alonso et al. 2015). However, it is contended that mixed/hybrid 
models have come to the fore recently because privatization is no longer politically viable or 
because neither the pure-public or pure-private route has emerged as the natural choice 
(Warner and Bel 2008; Florio 2014). Perhaps the most well-known mixed model variant for 
public service delivery is Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) (Sclar 2015). In Europe, there 
have been more than 1,000 PPP-based (infrastructure) projects, with their capital value of 
approximately US$635 billion representing around half of total PPPs world-wide (Public 
Works Financing 2011; Lamman et al. 2013). Internationally, the United Kingdom (UK) 
remains one of the largest PPP actors in terms of the number and capital value of projects 
(KPMG 2010; European PPP Expertise Centre 2013). 
Ideologically, private sector involvement in public infrastructure and service delivery was 
driven by a belief in the superiority of the sector’s management approaches. This 
phenomenon, labelled New Public Management (NPM), emphasises the development of 
competition (e.g. quasi markets) for public service delivery and the use of extensive control 
regimes by the procuring authority to incentivize the service-delivering organizations to 
achieve targets set by the former (Diefenbach 2009; Florio 2014; Alonso et al. 2015). Thus, 
NPM places the state in a supervisory (principal) role vis-à-vis private infrastructure and 
service delivering organizations (agent) (Sclar 2015). While a belief in NPM rationalities 
could be one reason for governments to introduce PPPs (Broadbent and Laughlin 2005), other 
factors could be politically-motivated condemnation of public-sector competence and/or 
constrained public funds (Sclar 2015). Indeed, PPPs have spawned from a mixture of 
ideological, financial and political pressures, with the policy being ‘clothed in different 
garments’ (Greenway et al. 2004). 
Regardless of the motivations, PPPs lock the state into long-term contracts, with a 
fundamental issue facing the principal (state) being mission misalignment since the private 
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partner’s primary interest is investment returns (Sclar 2001). Moreover, PPPs possess a 
contextual and dynamic nature which could necessitate change management and contract re-
negotiations over their operational life (English and Baxter 2010). Furthermore, as the 
contracts are written a priori, they are invariably imperfect as it is impossible to incorporate 
clauses which address all potential operational and relational contingencies (Sclar 2015). 
Thus, compromise and negotiation are essential for contracts to function operationally. Given 
the challenges facing the state in governing PPPs, by focusing on a single road case study PFI 
project (hereafter ‘RCSP’), this paper articulates how project-level accounting-based controls 
and trust practices are enacted for governing the operations and inter-party relationships over 
the operational life cycle. Although, while it is difficult to determine the extent to which the 
findings from this RCSP can be generalized, Nisar (2007) argues that case study research 
enables an evaluation of key findings and emerging ideas by providing an opportunity for the 
intensive analysis of specific details often overlooked by other methods. Thus, these findings 
offer substantial empirical evidence to aid our understanding of the management and 
governance of PPP contracts, an area that has experienced limited scholarly inquiry (Steijn et 
al. 2011; Chung 2016; Caperchione et al. 2017). 
In terms of structure, the next section provides the theoretical underpinnings for the 
empirical analysis. Then, the background to the RCSP, including the research methods, is 
described. The subsequent two sections present the empirical findings and the paper’s 
theoretical contributions, policy implications and avenues for further research. 
 
THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS 
In the UK, the term PFI
a
 commonly refers to a PPP, with the transport sector of roads being 
the lead PFI adopter when it was officially launched in 1992 (Edwards et al. 2004). However, 
little attention has been devoted to the evaluation of operational roads PFI projects (Shaoul et 
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al. 2007). Also, internationally, as this sector is the highest recipient of private finance (Public 
Works Financing 2011; Yehoue 2013), it is an important area to research. When this study 
was conducted, there were 12 operational PFI contracts under the UK Highways Agency 
(HA)b, with a combined capital value of almost £2.5 billion (HA 2015).  
NPM-inspired policies have contributed to a more commercial-style approach to public-
sector governance with increased emphasis on value-for-money (VFM) (Coulson 2008; 
Demirag and Khadaroo 2008). This has impacted upon the structures and processes of 
accounting-based management controls with, inter alia, increased performance monitoring 
and incentives regimes (henceforth MCSc) to enable government to control service-delivery 
organizations and employees (Diefenbach 2009).  
Accounting technologies such as MCS serve as a means for operationalizing local policy 
objectives (Khadaroo 2014; Walker 2016). Consequently, as evidenced by this special issue, 
there is a desire to consider the linkages between accounting and public administration 
research in order to (better) understand how accounting and MCS are intertwined in public 
policy operationalization, together with the consequences for the public (taxpayers) 
(Kurunmäki and Miller 2011). Marques et al. (2011) note that within complex public-sector 
network organizational forms (e.g. PFIs), operational issues are delegated to private 
contractors, with the government department having a coordinating role within the network. 
Thus, MCS through inscription and calculations (Robson 1992; Walker 2016) could enable 
the procuring department to ‘govern’ by providing mechanisms for monitoring the 
contractors’ performance and incentivizing them to operate in accordance with the project’s 
goals (Marques et al. 2011).  
While MCS might provide guidance for service providers through appropriate feedback 
loops (Busco et al. 2006), influencing (shaping) their actions is achieved mainly through 
financial incentives (Compagni and Tediosi 2012). Indeed, since PFI’s adoption, successive 
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UK governments have supported performance-based unitary payments, including 
performance-related controls and incentives for risk-management and achieving VFM (Her 
Majesty’s Treasury (HMT) 2003, 2007, 2008, 2012). However, little is known about the 
operational dynamics of this major public policy domain (Toms et al. 2011; Andon 2012; 
Demirag et al. 2012). Consequently, this research is important as MCS implementation is 
complex (Bevan and Hood 2006; Speklé and Verbeeten 2014). Indeed, NPM-driven 
performance-measurement and incentive regimes can bring about judgement biases and 
perceptions of unfairness or subjectivity if the performance measures and/or relative weight 
attached to awarding or sanctioning decision making is contested (Franco-Santos et al. 2012; 
Speklé and Verbeeten 2014). Thus, the primary aim of this paper is to articulate how MCS are 
operationalized in a RCSP and explore their impact on contractors’ performance.  
Given the long-term and complex nature of PFIs, the embedded MCS, which are usually 
structured a priori, could be subject to change following interactions between localized actors 
(English and Baxter 2010). Therefore, within the RCSP, the interactions between MCS, the 
actors whose behavior the MCS tend to mediate and ‘trust practices’ are investigated (Minaar 
et al. 2016). In this context, trust practices represent the routines involving inter-party 
collaboration and the expression of sentiments or aspirations to address MCS-related tensions. 
Thus, in contrast to most accounting research on accounting-trust relationships where trust is 
conceptualized as a method of (informal) control, with the focus being on the implications of 
its presence or absence on MCS (Free 2008), this research seeks to understand ‘trust in the 
doing’ (i.e. the routines, understandings and knowledge that become mobilized for developing 
the contractual and relational governance within the context of this case study). Accordingly, 
this paper also analyzes the trust practices that are enacted (‘trust in the doing’) between the 
government and private-sector partners in the RCSP to address MCS conflicts in order to 
achieve the project objectives. 
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THE CASE STUDY  
Context 
The UK transport sector is chosen as the broader case study site given the significance of PFI 
spend in this area (Demirag et al. 2010), with the primary investigative area being a HA 
operational road PFI contract. Given some major UK PFI projects have failed and required 
government intervention in the transport sector (Shaoul et al. 2006; National Audit Office 
(NAO) 2009; Jupe 2011), this is a fitting focus. Moreover, since the UK has remained the 
largest actor in the international PFI market, with several European countries drawing on their 
experiences (Gerrard 2010), extracting academic, policy and practical lessons from a UK-
based case study is potentially constructive (Steijn et al. 2011; Chung 2016).  
Ross and Yan (2015) suggest that PFI is prevalent in the roads sector as there is relatively 
less need for large design changes. Moreover, in the UK, roads PFI have a stronger financial 
appeal than other sectors because of government guarantees for the HA’s PFI obligations 
(Shaoul et al. 2006). Nevertheless, UK government policy rationales for roads PFIs have 
changed over time, shifting from developing a private sector roads operating industry through 
shadow toll-based contracts to obtaining congestion solutions, commuter safety and 
environmental concerns (Edwards et al. 2004; Shaoul et al. 2007). In particular, for strategic 
roads, reducing congestion and improving road safety are key policy objectives (Department 
for Transport 2000a, b, 2004). Also, MCS in UK roads PFIs, particularly the (payment-based) 
incentive regimes, have developed more stringent performance-related criteria (Shaoul et al. 
2006, 2007), underpinned by an emerging government rationality of transferring and 
managing risks (Burke and Demirag 2015).  
This RCSP captures one of the largest UK roads PFIs and was signed soon after the 
advent of financial crisis, thus making it apposite for analyzing how strategic objectives for 
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the roads sector (i.e. reducing congestion and improving road safety) are operationalized 
through NPM-based regimes that predominantly involve performance monitoring and 
incentives. Additionally, this case study involves an elaborate control regime compared with 
other UK roads PFIsd. 
 
Background 
This RCSP’s rationale was that the underlying road (motorway) suffered high congestion 
levels, which created the potential for serious accidents and unreliable journey times (RCSP 
Business Case and publicly available official reportse). Under the RCSP’s terms, a single 
private sector contractor (hereafter ‘Special Purpose Vehicle’ (SPV)) was assigned 
responsibility for widening (construction) two sections of the motorway (approximately 40 
miles), together with operations and maintenance over the contract’s 30-year life for the entire 
road (approximately 242 miles, which also included certain bridges and tunnels). The HA has 
executive responsibility for managing the contract and the RCSP was operational when this 
research was undertaken. 
As unitary payments during the construction phase are availability-based, the HA 
achieves VFM if the widening schemes are completed on-time and to-budget (HMT 2003). 
The operationalization of the project objectives (i.e. to reduce congestion and improve road 
safety) involves the HA mobilizing a complex arrangement of MCS in order to incentivize the 
private sector to meet a series of performance measures. After outlining the research methods, 
these issues are discussed below.  
 
Research methods 
Case studies are supported when the empirical objective is to analyze the day-to-day 
functioning of accounting in contemporary organizations (Humphrey and Scapens 1996). 
Page 7 of 36 Public Administration
7 
 
Because of their contextual and dynamic nature, Andon (2012) contends that the micro 
operations of PFI contracts should be researched using case study methodology. This study 
employs a qualitative case study methodology (Yin 2017), combining field-based interviews 
with archival data.  
To understand the RSCP’s contract management, particularly the control regimes, data 
was obtained from: (i) the RCSP Contract and the Business Case, which were obtained under 
a Freedom of Information Act (2000) request to the HA f ; (ii) the HA’s online policy 
information on PFI roads procurement; (iii) HMT’s and NAO’s guidance on PFI payment 
mechanisms, contract and inter-party relations management; and (iv) other related publicly-
available reports (Table A). The main subject of analysis within the RCSP contract was 
‘Schedule 18 – Contract and Performance Management’ (hereafter ‘Schedule-18’). This 
provides a detailed framework of the control regimes deployable during the RCSP’s 
operations and maintenance stages including: (i) a breakdown of the project objectives into 
key performance indicators (KPIs); (ii) performance monitoring, including performance 
review meetings and incentives mechanisms; and (iii) mechanisms for dispute resolutions. 
 
Insert Table A here 
 
Subsequently, senior individuals at the HA and SPV were contacted to seek their views 
on the research questions. Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) posit that interviews facilitate 
contrasting opinions to be obtained, while Bryman and Bell (2011) contend that semi-
structured interviews allow interesting areas to be explored, as was the case in this research. 
Moreover, interviewees in senior positions can be expected to have a broader perspective of 
the issues sought by the researcher (Spence and Rinaldi 2014). The meetings with the RCSP 
representatives complemented the document analysis, enabling a deeper understanding of the 
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control and trust practices. During the interviews, some additional RCSP-related documents 
were supplied by the interviewees. 
The interview questions were shaped by the literature and themes from the document 
analysis, with three main areas emerging: firstly, the use of PFI for procuring roads together 
with the effectiveness of the control regimes within roads PFI contracts; secondly, the 
operationalization and consequences (i.e. effectiveness or tensions) of the MCS within the 
RCSP contract for reducing congestion and improving road safety; and thirdly, the use of trust 
practices to achieve project objectives.  
More specific (including confidential) RCSP-related documents were also obtained from 
the interviewees via email. As some of these documents were part of newly-developed 
strategic management tools emerging from trust practices, they facilitated an in-depth 
understanding of how key elements of MCS operated and were being (re)shaped by trust 
practices. Thus, the field-based interviews and supplementary documents enabled an 
understanding of ‘trust in the doing’, together with the MCS-related concerns of the public 
and private parties. The data was coded using qualitative data analysis software QSR-NVivo-
9.2. 
Initially, four (semi-structured) interviews were conducted, two at the HA and two at the 
SPV (with each lasting approximately one hour). In both organizations, the interviewees 
included a senior official responsible for managing the RCSP and an accounts/finance official 
who dealt with the payment mechanisms. In the HA, the RCSP’s contract manager (hereafter 
‘Contract Manager-HA’) and two payment mechanism officials responsible for calculating 
SPV payments (hereafter ‘Paymech Official-HA’) were interviewed. At the SPV, it was the 
CEO (hereafter ‘CEO-SPV’) and the finance director (hereafter ‘Finance Director-SPV’). The 
interviews were recorded with the interviewees’ permission and later transcribed, with the 
transcripts being sent to the interviewees for validation. Two subsequent telephone interviews 
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were undertaken, with each lasting approximately 45 minutes. One of the authors visited the 
RCSP on a number of occasions to observe how certain safety and congestion-related 
performance issues aligned with the themes emerging from the document analysis and 
interviews. Overall, the data collection, interviews and site visits were undertaken between 
2012 and 2017. 
Having outlined the background to the RCSP and the research methods employed, the 
next two sections present the empirical analysis. 
 
THE USE OF MCS FOR OPERATIONALIZING GOVERNMENT’S OBJECTIVES 
IN THE RCSP 
Background 
An underlying principle for setting controls in PFI contracts is for procuring authorities to 
clearly specify project objectives in terms of outputs, with the contractor being incentivized to 
deliver against them (HMT 2007). Accordingly, there should be formal outcome controls that 
specify project objectives, monitor the contractor’s performance against the targets and link 
consortium incentives to performance target attainment (Marques et al. 2011).  
The RCSP’s outcome controls (operations and maintenance) comprise three fundamental 
elements (Figure A): (i) performance indicators (PIs); (ii) performance monitoring; and (iii) 
performance management (incentives regime). Performance monitoring and reporting, 
together with the RCSP’s performance management regimes (Figure A), particularly with 
respect to the project objectives of reducing congestion and improving road safety, are now 
discussed.  
 
Insert Figure A here 
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Performance monitoring and reporting in the RCSP 
PFI guidance stresses that procuring authorities should establish performance monitoring and 
reporting regimes as these are instrumental for contract and payment management (HMT 
2007). This is illustrated in Figure A by the dotted arrows that connect the performance 
monitoring, reporting and incentive regimes. The RCSP includes KPIs g  for reducing 
congestion and improving road safety (Figure Bh). 
The development of KPIs (Figure B) represents their long-term strategic nature, requiring 
investment for delivering safety and congestion improvement schemes over the contract’s 30-
year life. From the data analysis, ‘lane-availability’ was identified as the most significant 
(day-to-day) KPI for reducing congestion as it incentivizes the SPV to avoid lane closure, lane 
narrowing or temporary speed limits when undertaking daytime life-cycle works on the 
project road (Figure A). 
The RCSP contract gives the HA the right to assess the SPV’s performance against the 
KPIs and requires the SPV to cooperate with the HA in conducting audits or inspections. 
Moreover, it establishes procedures for self-reporting by the SPV regarding performance 
failures, an important feature of RCSP performance monitoring (Figure A).  
 
Insert Figure B here 
 
The SPV produces monthly, quarterly and annual reports (Figure A), with Schedule-18 
establishing the monthly report as the primary document for SPV performance monitoring. 
This contains performance information against 250-300 targets, with the performance 
achieved against each being color-coded. Moreover, it includes performance dashboards 
which provide graphical and bulleted information about performance against KPIs for all 
project objectives on a month-by-month rolling basis, together with three-month projections. 
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The monthly reports are reviewed by the HA and SPV at a Monthly Management Review 
meeting (Figure A). The HA uses a scorecard approach for measuring the SPV’s performance 
annually, called ‘Proactive Management Review’ (PMR). A PMR panel measures the SPV’s 
performance against the broader project objectives, awarding a score which is linked to 
financial rewards (i.e. bonus payments) based on the panel’s judgment about performance 
(Figure A). 
Therefore, RSCP performance monitoring was enabled by accounting as a technology of 
inscription and calculation. Audits, ad hoc HA inspections, periodic SPV performance reports 
and Monthly Management Review meetings relied on accounting numbers to enable the HA 
to monitor a distant domain of affairs. A partnering organization’s motivation to cooperate in 
achieving the network’s objectives could derive from ‘material interest’i, ‘coercion or fear’j. 
Hence, (financial) incentives, linked to performance monitoring regimes, could motivate the 
private contractor to achieve the desired project goals (Marques et al. 2011). However, 
performance measurement systems can cause discord if applied over-zealously and/or where 
performance measures do not produce the intended goals (Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman 
2000). Such issues are discussed later in the context of the RCSP. 
 
Performance management (incentives) regime in the RCSP 
The incentives for managing the SPV’s performance against project objectives are non-
financial and financial, and include penalties and rewards (Figure A). Their enforcement 
during the operations and maintenance stages, together with their effectiveness in 
incentivizing the SPV to reduce congestion and improve road safety (Figure B), is now 
explored. 
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Non-financial incentives in the RCSP 
Non-financial incentives are activated when there are performance failures by the SPV. The 
four non-financial incentives (Figure A) are presented in order of severity, and their 
classification from 1-3 should make the SPV wary about more severe consequences if the 
related under performance remains unrectified. Under the RCSP contract, the issuance of a 
warning notice or performance-pointsk by the HA leads to increased performance monitoring 
at the SPV’s expense. Mechanisms for performance points are detailed in Schedule-18 which 
describes the performance areas that could cause the SPV to receive performance points 
(based on specified formulae). Performance points are considered an effective incentive for 
PFI contractors, with their implications alerting financiers (NAO 1998). The accumulation of 
performance points creates additional costs for the SPV as it has to comply with further 
monitoring requirements (at 500 points) or even lose the PMR-bonus (at 600 points). 
Moreover, if under performance or an obligation breach during the operations and 
maintenance stage remains unrectified and leads to the accumulation of more than 3,500 
points, contract termination could result.  
With respect to improving safety and reducing congestion through improvement schemes 
(Figure B), the SPV’s failure to meet targets can lead to performance points being levied: 
...[I]n case of Safety Action Plans... it’s a performance point incentive. So, they [sub-
contractors] must deliver the Safety Action Plans to keep performance points down.... 
(CEO-SPV) 
While the SPV managed its performance points, it disputed the underlying performance 
measures and how they were weighted and used for sanctioning. Thus, performance points 
were viewed as a source of inter-party tension: 
...when you are trying to justify value-for-money, picking up performance points doesn’t 
feel like value-for-money. So, that’s been a tension right the way through. Some say it is a 
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good tension; I don’t think so because you are not working as a collective, you are not 
working as a team, you are working as two sides. (CEO-SPV)  
Previous research indicates that performance points were only issued after warnings (Edwards 
et al. 2004). However, in this contract, performance points have been levied since the 
commencement of operations and maintenance services. Thus, it appears that the HA has 
become more meticulous about using contractual MCS following the failure of other transport 
PFI projects due to poor project governance (NAO 2010).  
After being sanctioned, if the SPV fails to rectify the underlying breach within the 
stipulated remedial period, the HA can direct the SPV to perform certain actions, undertake 
the necessary rectification itself or engage others (Figure A). The SPV has to bear the costs 
incurred by the HA in taking such actions. The HA may also terminate the contract following 
a serious contractual breach (e.g. abandoning operations) or performance points exceeding the 
3,500 threshold. However, termination must be evaluated in terms of costs and benefits, 
together with the availability of alternative service delivery mechanisms (NAO 2006). 
While the RCSP’s non-financial incentives have financial consequences for the SPV, 
performance-based payment mechanisms are central to PFI policy risk allocation strategies 
(see ‘Theoretical Underpinnings’). The RCSP’s payment mechanisms (Figure A), and their 
effectiveness in shaping the SPV’s conduct towards achieving the objectives of improving 
road users’ safety and reducing congestion, are now discussed. 
 
Financial incentives in the RCSP 
RSCP unitary-payments, which are paid monthly to the SPV, comprise three elements: (i) 
base-service amount; (ii) performance adjustments; and (iii) other (non-performance) 
adjustments. Performance adjustments, which represent the SPV’s financial incentives, have 
six elements (Figure A), of which three (lane availability, route performance and unplanned 
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event management) are monthly adjustments related to reducing congestionl. Of the remaining 
three, one relates to maintaining the ‘road condition’ (calculated monthly) and two (Safety 
Performance Adjustment (SPA) and PMR bonus) are calculated annually. 
Lane availability and road condition are deductions, whereas unplanned event 
management and SPA are a (capped) deduction or bonus. The PMR bonus ranges from £0.25-
£0.75 million per year and is payable if the SPV obtains a score of 2 or higher on the PMR 
scorecard (Figure A). Since contract commencement, no PMR bonus has been awarded 
which, consistent with Speklé and Verbeeten (2014), is a cause of frustration for the SPV as it 
believes the PMR scorecard unfairly reflects performance: 
...if you look at the description under each of the boxes they are quite subjective. So, you 
have got subjectivity on top of subjectivity. For example, the score this year was 1.7 out 
of 4.0 …that’s like 4 out of 10. So, is the contract which you are seeing on the ground a 4 
out of 10? Clearly not. So, there is a lot of interpretation needed to make this a 
reasonable statement of how good this contract is. There is work to be done. (CEO-SPV) 
Having discussed the payment mechanisms in broad terms, the adjustments relating to the 
two primary project objectives of reducing congestion and improving road safety, together 
with whether they have achieved their goals by incentivizing the SPV to deliver against the 
KPIs (Figure B), are now considered.  
 
Payment-based incentives for improving road users’ safety 
With respect to improving safety by reducing the number of serious accidents, the SPA is the 
only (financial) incentive operationalized (Figure A). This adjustment, while not specifically 
linked to the safety-related KPIs, is allied to the overall outcome (i.e. trend in KSI
m
 
accidents). Since operations and maintenance services commenced, the SPA is an annual 
deduction. The SPV expressed reservations about this formula as it compares RCSP KSI data 
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with comparator roads:  
…you can see they took £4.0 million off me. I didn’t do anything, it’s because they got the 
formula wrong. So that’s a disincentive. (CEO-SPV) 
Moreover, in terms of the SPA’s effectiveness as an incentive for delivering safety-
related action plans and improvement schemes (Figure B), the regime appeared not to 
empower the SPV because the measures to which it was linked were not totally controllable 
by the contractors. It was acknowledged that contractors had limited influence on controlling 
accidents: 
I would far rather be incentivized for the things which I have influence over. So, I have 
influence over the way I manage the asset, the road surface, the bridges, the viaducts.... 
But the travelling public, I am not incentivized. (CEO-SPV) 
As a consequence, the HA capped the SPA.  
While capping financial incentives could be a risk-management strategy for government, 
this may dis-incentivize the private sector to work towards long-term strategic objectives, 
such as delivering safety-related programs and improvement schemes (Figure B): 
If you look at the Safety Performance Adjustment, that is capped at a £1.0 million plus or 
minus each year. Then you think ‘what investment do they have to make in order to make 
a difference?’ Perhaps they are actually better off not spending that money. (Contract 
Manager-HA) 
The SPV acknowledged that the SPA’s capped value was a disincentive: 
…if they were giving us £10 or £15 or £20 million each year then I think you could see a 
big difference. (CEO-SPV) 
The payment mechanisms, particularly whether lane closure deductions (Figures A and 
B) have been effective in incentivizing the SPV to reduce congestion, are now examined. 
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Payment-based incentives for reducing congestion 
With regards to reducing congestion, lane availability (Figure A) is the most significant 
financial incentive, with penalty deductions potentially amounting to £5-£6 million per year. 
Unlike road-safety KPIs, the SPV can influence lane availability for planned works. This may 
explain why the lane-availability deduction is uncapped as the payment mechanism 
incentivizes the contractors to avoid daytime maintenance. The SPV employed innovative 
methods to prevent lane closure or temporary speed limits: 
On the [xyz] bridge there are some very big expansion joints.... We worked out that if we 
were going to repair those it would cost something like a million pounds in closure 
charges. So, what we have done is design some ramps which go over the top of the road 
surface... and what we do then is work from underneath. So, the incentivization for us is 
to use innovation to deliver that. (CEO-SPV) 
However, the payment mechanisms did not appear to incentivize the SPV to implement 
congestion-easing schemes (Figure B) as these require considerable investment which the 
payment mechanisms did not match. Moreover, similar to safety improvement schemes, as 
contractors viewed certain congestion factors as uncontrollable, the payment mechanisms 
failed to motivate the SPV to invest in congestion-easing schemes:  
When it comes to looking at how you reduce congestion, it is a very difficult issue 
because there are many reasons why traffic gets congested. The extent to which the PFI 
company can influence that is a matter of conjecture.... We have no control over traffic 
signals. Next door is the Highways Agency and they control all the big gantries; we 
don’t. So you have to ask yourself to what extent you can do anything to reduce it 
[congestion]. We can’t do a radio or television advert, talk to the public, go on Twitter or 
Facebook. So, as you are a driver, I can’t talk to you. So how am I going to affect 
congestion? (CEO-SPV) 
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While performance points incentivized the SPV given their financial consequences, 
including the ultimate sanction of termination, overall, the RCSP MCS were perceived as a 
dis-incentive given their tendency to penalize rather than reward. While the HA capped some 
of the payment-based incentives (e.g. SPA) in recognition of the contractor’s inability to 
influence the risk factors underlying outcome achievement, this proved a dis-incentive with 
respect to delivering long-term congestion and safety-related improvement schemes. Thus, the 
performance management regimes operated bureaucratically and without proper 
incentivization which limited their effectiveness. Therefore, the deployed MCS resulted in 
dissonance between the HA and the SPV (i.e. the contracting parties): 
Do they believe that we will always act in their best interest? Do they believe that they 
are getting the best service? I feel that the answer to all that is ‘no’.... So, I would say 
fundamentally this relationship will always be fragile. (CEO-SPV) 
It was also observed that the operationalization of the performance monitoring 
mechanisms failed to provide opportunities for developing positive feedback loops and 
therefore reduced chances for improving performance:  
If you look at the agenda of the Monthly Management Meeting, the way it is described in 
the contract is about beating with a stick the things that they are doing wrong.... In the 
contract, there is a lot of emphasis on ‘if things go wrong’ and less emphasis on ‘what we 
need to do to make sure they do things right’. (Contract Manager-HA) 
If MCS do not provide opportunities for positive feedback to the contractors and/or they 
perceive procedural unfairness in their deployment, this may negatively impact on 
performance and relationships. In these instances, the partners can rely on trust practices to 
agree collectively acceptable controls (Minaar et al. 2016). Accordingly, the next section 
considers how trust practices between the HA and the SPV are developed and utilized to 
address MCS-related tensions. 
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IMPLICATION OF TRUST PRACTICES FOR OPERATIONALIZING 
GOVERNMENT’S PFI POLICY OBJECTIVES IN THE RCSP 
While the RCSP contract accommodates dispute resolution and joint-membership governance 
bodies, which could induce trust between the HA and the SPV, this research found that trust 
practices, such as collaboration and trust-based interaction between the HA and the SPV (and 
between the latter and sub-contractors), emerged spontaneously in response to contractual 
tensions. The previous section identified tensions between the HA and the SPV in relation to 
how the contract specified output and performance expectations. Particularly, it was observed 
that initially it was difficult for the SPV to align the output requirements with the HA’s 
expectations, resulting in the SPV accumulating considerable performance points. In 
response, the SPV initiated dialogue with the HA and its sub-contractors to clarify the 
situation: 
When we first started off I think there was a degree of naivety by both parties about how 
this project would work. Over the months and years, it got progressively better. We 
would have regular meetings. We talked to them about the dilemmas we faced.... (CEO-
SPV) 
Interviewees indicated that a limitation of PFI was that, since the contracts are drafted ex 
ante, they could not address all potential uncertainties, unintended consequences and inter-
party tensions; hence, the control regimes might not facilitate managing such issues when 
they arise. Therefore, the deployed MCS are unlikely to be aligned with the potential risks and 
uncertainties:  
It is not sufficient if your intent with this contract was to actually wrap everything up in 
the payment and performance regimes and never revisit them, it is not enough. You know, 
you need to actually manage it actively…. (Contract Manager-HA) 
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Since predicting all possible uncertainties, whether relating to contractors’ performance, 
demand, relationships or handback, is impractical in such long-term contracts, clauses that 
enable cooperation and re-negotiation are often included (Ross and Yan 2015; Chung 2016). 
This was evidenced during the field visits, with collaborative dialogue being employed to 
address contract-related tensions. Indeed, the complexity of defining strategic (outcome-
based) objectives, such as improving congestion and road safety, was evident. Here, trust 
practices over the operational phase facilitated cooperation between the partners to develop 
(non-contractual) strategies for addressing performance-related ambiguities and complexities 
contained in the original MCS: 
What we found was that there was a complete mismatch between this [pointing to 
Schedule-18] and this [pointing to a currently developed RCSP KPI document]. What we 
tried to do was to bring the two together and that is why we created this document which 
is called the Network Business Plan. It is a practical document and what you can see 
here is how we look at all the strategic objectives and how we deliver against those on a 
year-by-year basis. (CEO-SPV) 
Such collaboration was viewed positively by the HA, with consultants facilitating risk-
management dialogue between the HA and the SPV: 
I think we have worked hard to build a kind of open dialogue about understanding each 
other’s risks and concerns. We have employed collaboration consultants to help us come 
up with ways of defining acceptable behaviors.... What we try to do is to identify mutual 
risks, sort of high risks for one another. Collaboration and trust-building is really 
important for the visibility of our collective risks... and working jointly trying to resolve 
those. (Contract Manager-HA) 
Lenferink et al. (2013) suggest that real partnership (defined in this research as ‘trust 
practices’) between PFI partners could have significant (positive) impacts on project 
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outcomes. Such practices could involve adopting non-contractual strategies to manage the 
project within a complex environment (Steijn et al. 2011). For instance, Chung (2016) 
highlights that PFI contracts usually omit formal guidance for managing contract closure and 
asset handback, with their absence posing operational and relational risks. 
Contractors expressed the need for regular collaboration with the HA to achieve project 
objectives since, as discussed previously, their influence over them was limited: 
…actually, if I am really going to have an impact on safety I should be working hand-in-
glove with the Agency.… Similarly, in relation to congestion, the traffic officers there [in 
the HA], you have to ask yourself why aren’t we one team? (CEO-SPV) 
Moreover, consistent with Barretta et al. (2008), this research found that rust practices are 
required not just between the public-sector client and the SPV, but between the latter and sub-
contractors as their performance could impact the SPV’s incentives: 
In terms of relationship between us and the O&M-JV [Operations and Maintenance Joint 
Venture], there has been a lot of tension because our penalties have largely resulted from 
their lack of performance. So, we have a new initiative going on. Our goal and objective 
is to have an alliance programme.... We are also looking at collaborative working on 
asset management. So that is building bridges and I think it is working very well. (CEO-
SPV) 
With regards to the dis-incentives arising from how payment mechanisms functioned, the 
public and private sector parties contended that the (original) formulation and 
operationalization of the payment regimes had delivered unexpected and unintentional results 
(see previous section: 
I think the main thing we didn’t get right on these [payment] mechanisms is that we did 
not test them enough. Did we really want deductions in the first few years on safety 
mechanism? …And there are similar issues with the congestion one…. A big issue for us 
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is change and change management. I think we should have had in the business case the 
long-term strategic risks of the Agency and how we intended to manage those with this 
contract. And in terms of change I think it is just damn hard work. (Contract Manager-
HA) 
In order to address these anomalies, particularly the SPA, the HA and the SPV negotiated 
changes to the formulae to incentivize the latter: 
We are looking at a strategic change of pay-mech to give them incentives and a bonus to 
go and do better things about safety and all other things. (Paymech Official-HA) 
Accordingly, trust practices involving collaboration, dialogue and the development of 
non-contractual project governance frameworks were important for the RCSP’s strategic 
management, including whole life-of-contract risk management, and for adjusting MCS-
related anomalies to better incentivize the private sector to deliver the project’s objectives. 
From the public sector’s perspective, their participation in trust practices is justified because 
of the reputational risk associated with service continuity (Shaoul et al. 2012): 
What we want is the DBFO-Co to act as we would. We expect from them that level of 
ownership. And they can only do that if we have a level of mutual understanding. And 
mutual understanding and trust are similar, not identical. I think mutual understanding is 
a kind of key point and trust is the next step on from that. (Contract Manager-HA) 
The notion that mutual understanding could enable the development of a trust-based 
relationship in contractual inter-organizational settings is consistent with Minaar et al. (2016). 
Thus, an interactive review of the contract designed to develop a mutual understanding of 
each partner’s needs could be constitutive of trust practices and contribute to the development 
of a trusting and collaborative relationship.  
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Over the past two decades, the use of hybrid models, especially PPPs, has increased globally 
for delivering public infrastructure projects, particularly roads. However, to date, little is 
known about the operational dynamics of PPPs, including how accounting controls and inter-
party trust practices are employed. Internationally, the UK is a lead adopter of PPPs, with PFI 
being the most well-known. Previous research has focused on the initial stages of PPP, with 
limited attention given to operational projects (Toms et al. 2011; Andon 2012). In addition, 
prior research has often criticized the outcome of the operational phase due to contract rigidity 
in the early phases, with subsequent detrimental consequences for taxpayers (Broadbent et al. 
2008; Demirag et al. 2012).  
This paper examines how UK road PFI contracts are managed during their operational 
stages and develops our understanding of MCS and trust practices in achieving contract 
objectives. From an accounting and public administration perspective, a major theoretical and 
practical implication of the findings is that, as the UK government’s power to govern PFI 
projects through accounting and MCS may not guarantee the achievement of policy 
objectives, the enabling mechanism of trust practices is necessary. Indeed, this research 
indicates that different ideologies and incentives between the parties can be negotiated and 
reconciled through such practices. Thus, pragmatism can overcome some of the difficulties 
anticipated in the PPP/PFI literature.  
Analysis of the RCSP’s performance monitoring practices suggests that accounting 
provides panoptical mechanisms for the HA to have knowledge of the SPV’s performance, 
thus enabling interventions in situations of under-performance. However, elements relating to 
original expectations on issues such as availability and safety, which have direct financial 
consequences on the SPV, functioned bureaucratically and did not provide positive feedback 
loops. Therefore, such monitoring has limited positive impact on SPV performance. The 
Page 23 of 36 Public Administration
23 
 
financial incentives, as practiced through the RCSP’s payment mechanisms, were also found 
to cause disincentives for the SPV and tensions with the HA. Firstly, aspects of the payment 
mechanism did not incentivize the private sector to attain the relevant performance targets for 
accidents and congestion as the contractors could not fully influence the factors responsible 
for their achievement. However, when the contractors could influence the underlying project 
objectives (e.g. managing daytime maintenance), the financial incentives were perceived as 
effective (e.g. payment mechanism for lane availability). Secondly, payment mechanisms 
failed to adequately incentivize contractors to pursue long-term strategic performance targets 
(e.g. implementing safety and congestion-related improvement plans) because the financial 
reward was deemed inadequate. Thirdly, the payment mechanisms could cause dissonance, 
particularly if contractors did not perceive that performance is measured and rewarded fairly. 
In this case, the SPA and PMR were viewed as penalizing the SPV.  
Although the RCSP’s monitoring and incentive regimes are extensive, as they were 
deployed in a bureaucratic style they failed to induce trust-based cooperation between the HA 
and the SPV. This is consistent with Coletti et al. (2005) who argue that the trust-building 
benefits of MCS may not be experienced without feedback mechanisms. From a policy and 
practical perspective, while Coletti et al. (2005) contend that a strong MCS may be deployed 
earlier, this research suggests that control regimes should be employed from contract 
inception more interactively with opportunities for testing and adaptation. This might reduce 
MCS costs since early interaction and cooperation could foster a trusting relationship and 
facilitate the (effective) operation of controls. Clear mechanisms and contractual guidelines 
for contract re-negotiation could avert substantial (avoidable) costs arising from elaborate 
arbitration systems (Ross and Yan 2015).  
Furthermore, the analysis of the enactment of trust practices suggests that they provide 
opportunities for the SPV and the HA to revisit certain MCS elements. This is consistent with 
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Minnaar et al.’s (2016) assertion that trust can emerge as a ‘quasi’ actor in inter-
organizational networks by assigning ‘properties of trust’ to the contract (MCS in this case). 
In PFIs, complexity may be imposed by the various players involved in contract design and 
execution, which could cause mission-misalignment due to multiple (conflicting) objectives. 
With such complexity, this could raise governance and control challenges for the principal 
(state), especially given the difficulties involved in terminating a PFI contract and finding 
alternative contractors (Jupe 2011). Thus, trust practices are essential for sustaining inter-
party relationships.  
This argument is consistent with literature on governance of public-sector networks. 
Lenferink et al. (2013) assert that dialogue and collaboration between public and private 
sector partners could span the planning, procurement and post-procurement lifecycles. They 
contend that this could enable partners to gain continuous insight into each other’s mission 
and issues, leading to trusting relationships. Our findings on how trust practices are used for 
achieving project objectives are also supported by Steijn et al. (2011), who posit that PFI 
managerial strategies could have a significant impact on project outcomes. Such strategies 
involve collaboration, joint working and greater exchange of information (i.e. trust practices), 
without which it is difficult to achieve desired outcomes (Klijn et al. 2010). Thus, public and 
private sector PFI contract managers (at least in the UK roads sector) would have to act 
(additionally) as network managers which could be challenging as UK PFI contracts are 
typically structured more tightly than their European counterparts (Steijn et al. 2011). This 
provides interesting research avenues as researchers analyzing the translation of NPM-based 
MCS within contemporary public-sector networks could study the role of trust practices 
together with network managers as enablers.  
Due to cross-country differences in policy interventions and institutional arrangements 
for public service delivery, PPPs are disparate (Hodge and Greve 2017). As this RCSP is 
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located within the UK’s road sector, this may limit the extent to which the findings can be 
generalized. However, given the limited empirical evidence about the micro-level operational 
management and relationship practices for these hybrid organizations (Steijn et al. 2011; 
Andon 2012; Chung 2016), our study provides new insights which could form the basis for 
further comparative case study research. Investigation of the significance of the performance-
based incentives in financial terms is also needed. This is important as PFI investors are 
reported to have earned high returns (Hellowell and Vecchi 2012). While this research 
examines the effectiveness of the MCS with respect to achieving the HA’s objectives, an 
analysis of users’ (commuters’) satisfaction could be conducted. This might facilitate an 
assessment of whether (and how) PFI can deliver VFM for taxpayers. 
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Notes 
                                                            
a  Internationally PFI-type models are also termed Privately Financed Projects (PFPs) or Public Private 
Partnerships (PPPs or P3). This paper uses the UK-specific term, PFI. This is a long-term arrangement whereby 
a government department acquires (through competitive bidding) construction services for public infrastructure 
(e.g. a road), together with post-construction maintenance and services, from the private sector under a single 
contract in return for unitary payments linked to the latter’s performance under the contract. PFI procurements 
are mainly privately financed, with contracts typically for 25-30 years (Her Majesty’s Treasury 1995, 2008). 
b In 1994, the UK government established the HA as an executive agency of the Department for Transport with 
responsibility for the construction and maintenance of England’s strategic road network. In April 2015, the HA 
became a government company, ‘Highways England’. Existing PFI assets and liabilities (including this RCSP) 
were transferred to the newly-formed company (Highways England 2016). 
c Throughout this paper, such control regimes are referred to as MCS (management control systems), including 
those deployed by a government department within public-sector networks to control service-delivery 
organizations with the purpose of influencing the latter’s behavior in order to achieve desirable or predetermined 
outcomes (Marques et al. 2011). 
d As stated in official reports, which cannot be cited for confidentiality reasons. 
e Which cannot be cited for confidentiality reasons. 
f  As elements of these documents were redacted, including the financial values related to the payment 
mechanism, it was not possible to analyze the payment-based incentives from a financial perspective.  
g Key Performance Indicators. 
h Figure B illustrates the KPIs for the RCSP’s primary project objectives of reducing congestion and improving 
road safety. These KPIs were selected through the analysis of the RCSP’s Business Case and Schedule-18, on 
the basis of: 
• the significance of the KPIs in relation to the government’s strategic goals of improving safety and 
reducing congestion (Department for Transport 2000a, b, 2004); and 
• ensuring that the associated incentive regimes for the (selected) KPIs have been fully operational since the 
commencement of the project. 
i The partnering organization expects to gain an economic or strategic benefit from cooperating (Marques et al. 
2011). 
j If the partnering organization does not cooperate it will receive sanctions or penalties (Marques el al. 2011). 
k In older HA road PFI contracts, these were called ‘penalty points’. During the interviews, it transpired that the 
term was changed to avoid any negativity associated with the word ‘penalty’. 
l Route performance was not operationalized at the time of this research due to technical difficulties with the 
equipment. 
m Killed or seriously injured. 
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Table A: Key documents analyzed 
HM Treasury National Audit Office* RCSP-related documents
#
 
(i) PFI: Strengthening 
Long-term Partnerships 
(2006) 
(ii) Value for money 
Assessment Guidance 
(2006) 
(iii) Operational Taskforce 
Note 2 – Project 
Transition Guidance 
(2007) 
(iv) Standardization of PFI 
Contracts – Version 4 
(2007) 
(v)  OGC and HMT 
guidelines on 
Competitive Dialogues 
(2008) 
(vi) Infrastructure 
Procurement: 
Delivering Long-term 
Value (2008) 
(vii) Contract Expiry 
Guidelines, Operational 
Taskforce Note 4 
(viii) Public Private 
Partnerships – 
Technical Updates 
(2010) 
 
(i) Managing Relationships 
to secure a successful 
Partnership in PFI 
projects (2001) 
(ii) A Framework for 
Evaluating the 
Implementation of 
Private Finance 
Initiative Project, Vol. I 
and II (2006) 
(iii) From Private Finance 
Units to Commercial 
Champions: Managing 
complex capital 
investment programmes 
utilizing private finance 
- A current best practice 
model for Departments 
(2010) 
(i) RCSP Business Case 
(ii) RCSP Operations and 
Maintenance Contract 
(iii) Parliamentary, National 
Audit Office and 
newspaper reports on 
RCSP 
(iv) SPV’s Annual reports 
(v) HA’s on-line policy 
narrative on PFI 
procurements  
 
* All National Audit Office reports on UK Road PFIs were also analyzed. 
#
 Overall, the documentary data highlighted in this table comprised of approximately 1,500 pages.    
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 RCSP 
(Outcome controls) 
Performance monitoring and 
reporting 
Monthly Management Review 
Meeting between the HA and the 
SPV (and Operations & Maintenance 
Joint Venture) to discuss Monthly 
Report / Remedial Action Plan) 
Performance management (incentives 
regime) 
PIs 
2) Performance points 
Financial incentives 
Non-financial incentives 
1) Warning Notices  
4) Termination 
Performance-based Payment mechanism 
Figure A: A representation of MCS (outcome controls) in the RCSP 
Financiers’ due 
diligence 
3) Step-in Rights 
Other time to time 
performance 
monitoring: network 
board; quarterly and 
annual reports; Audits 
and Inspections 
Annual Proactive 
Management Review 
by PMR panel 
PIs feed into 
incentives’ 
thresholds and 
payment formulae 
PIs inform 
performance 
evaluation 
against targets 
Performance 
measurement 
triggers 
certain 
incentives 
regime 
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 Figure B: Translating policy objectives of reducing congestion and improving safety as KPIs in the RCSP 
Source: Developed from RCSP (Operations and Maintenance) Contract, Schedule-18 
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